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STATEMEN T OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case.
This is an appeal from a divorce judgment.

B. Course of Proceedings.
Donna filed for divorce on October 24, 2013. Stan filed his answer on October 29,
2013. On June 2, 3, and 4, 2015, the Court held the first three days of trial. On June 5,
2015, the parties agreed to the entry of an interim divorce decree and stipulated to a di vision
of some of their marital property. Due to their unfinished 2014 tax return evidence, the
parties continued the trial from June 5 until July 16, 2015, and the parties finished their
trial o,n that date. On September 3, 2015, Donna submitted her proposed findings and conclusions and closing arguments on the triable issues. On September 17, 2015, Stan submitted his proposed findings and conclusions and closing arguments on the triable issues.
On February 1, 2016, the Magistrate Court entered its findings of fact, (R. pp. 3847) and its memorandum decision and conclusions of law. (R. pp. 49-57). On February 16,
2016, the Magistrate Court entered a judgment of divorce. (R. pp. 58-60). Among other
things, the Magistrate ordered Stan to pay Donna $2,107,440.00 in equalization payments
and $4,500.00 in monthly spousal maintenance. (Id.). On March 28, 2016, Stan timely filed
a notice ofappeal to the District Court. (R. pp. 61-66). Donna did not cross-appeal.
On May 6, 2016, the District Court appointed Glen Townsend, CPA, as a receiver
during the appeal. (R. p. 75). Among his other duties, Mr. Townsend was ordered to collect
and account for any dividends and distributions from the MVH units. (Id.).
On November 9, 2018, Donna filed an amended motion to dismiss the appeal. (R.
p. 183). On December 14, 2018, the District Court denied the amended motion. (R. p. 318).
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On April 19, 2019, the parties made their appellate arguments to the District Court.
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 117-57). 1 On April 29, 2019, the District Court issued its Memorandum
Decision on the appeal. (R. pp. 320-37). The District Court remanded several issues back
to the Magistrate Court, including the proper valuation of the Class A units, the calculation
of Stan's impending tax consequences, the re-calculation of the equalization payment, and
the fair amount (if any) of spousal maintenance payments to Donna. (Id.).
On June 5, 2019, Donna filed her notice of appeal. (R. pp. 338-44). On June 24,
2019, Stan filed his notice of cross-appeal. (R. pp. 349-5 3).

C. Concise Statement of Facts.
Stan and Donna were married on August 25, 1978. They raised three children, all
of whom are now adults. Stan and Donna separated on October 16, 2013. Donna filed for
divorce on October 24, 2013. At the time of trial, both parties were

(R. p. 38).

Stan is an orthopedic surgeon. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 568, In. 8). During the marriage,
Donna was a homemaker, with only short periods of employment outside the home. (Tr.
Vol. 22, p. 250, ln. 1-25; 251, In. 1-25; 252, In. 1-2; 586, In. 4-25). Stan is facing the prospect of early retirement due to his health problems. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 595, ln. 21-23; 597, ln.
7-25; 598, In. 1-3; 599, In. 20-25; 600, In. 1-9). Donna failed to rebut this evidence at trial.
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 118, In. 19-23; p. 126, In. 8-25). The District Court confirmed this fact about
Stan's retirement and health problems in the first appeal. (R. 328). During the marriage,
Stan and Donna lived well below their financial means. (R. p. 56; Tr. Vol. II, p. 654, In.
21-24). Donna ran the household on a monthly budget of $4,500.00 (Tr. Vol. II, p. 274, ln.

1

11
11
Stan refers to the original transcripts lodged on August 26, 2019, as Vol. l, and to the augmented transcrip~s recently submitted by stipulation as "Vol. II."
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24-25; 275, ln. 1-5), but she could use credit cards for any additional expenses. (Tr. Vol.
II, p. 276, ln. 14-17). Stan paid D01ma approximately $6,500.00 per month pending entry
of the divorce judgment. (R. p. 43). The Magistrate Court ultimately awarded Donna
$4,500.00 per month in spousal maintenance, terminating in January 2020. (R. p. 59).
On June 5, 2015, following three days of trial, the parties divided their real property,
and most of their personal property, by stipulation. (R. pp. 35, 49, 58-59). But the parties
could not agree on the di vision of a bank account, a life insurance policy, a 401 k plan, and
the value of the Mountain View Hospital ("MVH") member units. The MVH units consisted of two classes: Class A units and Class RE units. The parties held some of the units
personally and the remainder in a business entity, Summit Orthopedic Equity ("SOE").
Stan is a one-third interest holder in SOE. (R. p. 230). During the trial, the parties spent a
considerable amount of time litigating the value of the units. (Tr., Vol. II, pp. 58-242).
The MVH units have express ownership and transfer restrictions, as established by
the Mountain View Hospital company operating agreement. (See Trial Exhibit D,
SO00060; Tr. Vol. II, p. 160, In. 23-25; 161, In. 1-5; 166, In. 11-17). Even the Magistrate
Court acknowledged that the units have "severe restrictions." (R. p. 39). As shown by Stan
at the trial,. the Class A units may only be held by physicians who are actively licensed in
Idaho, who have privileges to provide services at Mountain View Hospital, and who reside
within 50 miles of the hospital. Also, the hospital must approve all proposed unit sales.
(Id.; see also Tr. Vol. II, p. 531, In. 8- 12). These are conjunctive, or cumulative, restrictive
requirements. (Id.). Upon Stan's retirement, he must sell all his MVH units. (Id.). Upon his
retirement, the hospital has the first right to purchase Stan's units. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 183, ln.
20-25; 184, In. 1-7). The hospital has a written formula which it uses to value its units at
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the time of purchase. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 183, In. 1-8). To date, Mountain View has never purchased a physician's units at a price higher than the price set by its internal formula. (Tr.
Vol. II, p. 215, In. 12-20; 531, ln. 3-7; 559, In. 16-21 ). The company formula considers the
lack of control and lack of marketability of the units due to the transfer restrictions. (Tr. p.
125, ln. 11-23). Donna failed to contradict this evidence about the units at trial. (Id.).
The Magistrate Court made several findings and conclusions which Stan challenged
in his District Court appeal. First, the Magistrate Court held that the Class A units had a
value of $9,191.00 per unit. (R. p. 53). Next, the Court held that Donna was entitled to a
disproportionate sixty percent (60%) award of the total community property. (R. p. 54).
Finally, the Court found that Donna is entitled to a $2,107,440.00 equalization payment.
(R. 54 ). On appeal, the District Court remanded these issues back to the Magistrate Court
(R. pp. 320-37), along with Donna's spousal maintenance award. (R. pp. 334-35).
Stan believes that the District Court appropriately remanded the above issues to the
Magistrate Court and that Donna does not have a basis to further appeal. Stan intends to
address the factual basis of these issues on remand. Stan is only cross appealing the admission of expert testimony and the unequal division of community property. (R. p. 350).
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Stan is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal.
2. See Issues on Cross-Appeal, below, for additional statement of issues.
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
"A trial court's findings of fact which are based upon substantial, although conflicting, evidence will not be disturbed on appeal ... [but an appellate court] is free to draw its
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own conclusions of law from the facts presented." De Chambeau v. Estate of Smith, 132,
Idaho 568,571,9 76 P.2d 922,925 (1999) (internal citations omitted).
"[An appellate court] examines the magistrate record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether
the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. An abuse of discretion will
be found if the magistrate's findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence or if
the magistrate does not correctly apply the law." Moffett v, Moffett, 151 Idaho 90, 93,253
P.3d 764, 767 (Ct. App. 2011 ). A review for abuse of discretion on appeal "requires
consideration of [whether] the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently
with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise ofreason." State v. Le Veque, 426 P.3d 461,464 (2018).
"The question whether the lower court properly applied a legal theory is a question
of law over which [an appellate court] exercises free review." Schiewe v. Farwell, 125
Idaho 70, 74, 867 P.2d 944, 948 (Ct. App. 1992).
RESPONS E ARGUME NTS
1. The District Court Properly Denied the Motion to Dismiss.

The District Court properly denied Donna's motion to dismiss. (R. pp. 308- 19).
Donna did not have a valid basis for moving to dismiss. (Id.). The District Court correctly
analyzed Bechtel v. Evans, 10 Idaho 147, 77 P. 212 (1904), and the acceptance of benefits
doctrine. (Id.). The Supreme Court should affirm the District Court on appeal.
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To understand this dispute, the Supreme Court must consider the nature of Donna's
request. Donna asked the District Court to dismiss the parties' first appeal, i.e., Stan's appeal. (R. p. 183-95). Stan was the only party to file an appeal, (R. pp. 14, 61-66), and Donna
did not submit a cross-appeal. (Id.). This fact is critical because Stan was the only party to
ask the District Court for a remand of the other side's divorce awards, i.e., he asked for
remand of Donna's divorce awards. Stan was free to appeal Donna's awards without triggering the acceptance of benefits doctrine because he was not at risk of losing any of his
own property awards to Donna on remand, as illustrated in the following diagram:

TableiJ:IIlµstrati()n . of Stan~i].>ote11tialHen}fits on Appeal
100%

t
.

Stan's Current Benefits
{Approx. 40% of the
Community Estate)

'

0%

Stan had the potential to enjoy more
benefits as a result of the appeal, e.g.,
reduced alarnony, increased co1Y1munity
property awards, etc.

Stan did not have the potential to enjoy
fewer benefits as a result of the appeal,
i.e., Donna did not cross-appeal to
further reduce Stan's existing awards.
--- ----- -

--

As stated in Bechtel, the policy behind the acceptance of benefits doctrine is to
prevent appellants, like Stan, from seeking additional awards on appeal when they risk
losing (but have already exhausted) some of their existing property awards on appeal. The
doctrine does not apply to cases where one party, like Stan, is challenging the overvaluation
of an asset and the corresponding equalization payment tied to that asset In Bechtel, the
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appellant challenged a final judgment, which gave him a reduced amount of his litigation
costs. Just before the appeal, the respondent paid the appellant the full amount of the judgment and his reduced costs, giving the appellant the full benefit the judgment and the reduced costs. Afterward, the respondent moved to dismiss the appeal, saying that the entire
appeal was moot because the appellant was already enjoying the benefits of his judgment
and costs. The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that the "acceptance of benefits" doctrine only applies to situations where the appellant "incurs the hazard of eventually recovering less" than his original judgment. Jd at p. 150. The Court said:
1

''[If] the appeal is from such an order or judgment as that he could in no event
recover a less favorable judgment and that he incurs no hazard of ever receiving
less than the judgment already collected by him, we see no objection to the prosecution of his appeal."

Id., p. 150. Thus, the Bechtel Court expressly rejected the type of argument that
Donna is trying to advance on this appeal. The Court found that the appellant had not violated the acceptance of benefits doctrine by receiving a payment of his judgment and reduce~ costs before the appeal. The Court reasoned that the appellant "could in no event
receive less than the amount allowed him by the district judge." Id. In his District Court
appeal, Stan was challenging the amount of Donna's property awards, trying to reduce the
amount of the awards. Stan was successful in his appeal, as the District Court remanded
several issues back to the Magistrate Court. (R. pp. 320-37). But that outcome does not
trigger the acceptance of benefits doctrine, as Donna was not entitled to obtain some of
Stan's original property awards on remand. Stan is not at risk (and never was at risk) of
losing the benefit of his original property awards on remand. The acceptance of benefits
doctrine does not apply because Stan could only gain value (but never lose it) on remand.
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Donna says that the District Court failed to consider that Stan "has received and
accepted substantial benefits under the Judgment." (Appellant's Brief; p. 5). However, that
fact is irrelevant because the acceptance of benefits doctrine only looks at whether Stan has
exhausted benefits that Donna could receive on remand. The doctrine does not apply to
Stan's challenge to the overvaluation of his equalization payment. Donna continues to ignore the fact that she is not entitled to any of Stan's benefits on remand, and that Stan's
appeal was from "such an order or judgment as that he could in no event recover a less
favorable judgment and that he incurs no hazard of ever receiving less than the judgment
already collected by him." Bechtel, p. 150. The Bechtel rule, as Donna frames it, does not
help Donna because she failed to challenge any of Stan's original property awards.
The District Court has already explained that Bechtel does not apply to Donna's
situation. The Court correctly interpreted Bechtel in its memorandum decision:
In sum, if the appealing party could potentially suffer a reduction in his award upon
appeal, then the appeal should be denied. However, if there exists no such risk, then
the appeal should be allowed to go forward.
(R. p. 310). The Court went on to explain that other courts have relaxed the doctrine
(Id.), that other courts do not strictly use the doctrine, (R. p. 311 ), that other courts tend
toward a more equitable use of the doctrine (Id.), and that other courts do not use the doctrine in cases of only partial acceptance of a judgment. (Id.). The District Court found that
2
these cases all worked in Stan's favor. (Id.). The District Court also noted that Bechtel

ultimately allowed the appellant to bring his appeal, despite his acceptance of benefits.
(Id.). Donna continues to ignore this fact about Bechtel and tries to make small, distinguishing points about the District Court's analysis. (Appellant's Brief pp. 6-7; Tr. Vol. I,
2

Donna tr.ies to distinguish these cases in her appellate brief, (Appellant's Brief, pp. 6-7). In in the interests
of judicial economy, Stan will not discuss these cases, except to note that the District Court correctly applied the cases (R. pp. 310-11 ), and that Donna failed to meaningfully distinguish them.

Respondent's Brief, Cross-Appell ant's Brief l Page 13

pp. 91 ~92). But in doing so, Donna is not applying the central holding and outcome in
Bechtel. Donna overlooks the fact that the other cited cases, e.g., cases which narrow the
doctrine, are only peripheral to the central point of Bechtel and the District Court's decision
on dismissal, i.e., that Stan was allowed to appeal because he was not at risk of a reduced
property award on remand. The Supreme Court should reject Donna's attempts to misuse
Bechtel. The Supreme Court should uphold the District Court in the matter.
Continuing, the District Court found that Stan was not subject to the acceptance of
benefits doctrine when "it would be impossible to refrain from using those assets awarded."
(R. p. 312). The Court noted that Stan was compelled to live in his house during the appeal,
and so the doctrine did not apply to any improvements made on appeal. (Id.). The Court
noted that Donna had acquiesced, by reason of the parties' divorce stipulation, for Stan to
use the house during the appeal. (R. p. 313). The Court explained that Donna had failed to
show any prejudice in Stan's receipt of dividends and his payment of taxes during the appeal. (R. pp. 313-18). Donna responds to the issue by saying that she is not required to
show prejudice (Appellant's Brief, p. 8), but that if she were, she suffered prejudice in terms
of a "deeper financial disparity between the parties" (Id., p. 9). Donna goes so far as to
3
suggest, incorrectly, that she might be entitled to the home on remand. (Id., p. 8). Again,

Donna did not cross-appeal any of Stan's property awards to the District Court, and so
there no possibility of Stan exhausting benefits to which Dom1a might be entitled on remand. Donna's discussion of financial disparity is a complete red herring.
3

1

The District Court did not remand any of the parties' stipulated property divisions, including Stan s stipulated house award. If Donna prevails on remand, the parties will keep their existing awards. If Stan prevails
on remand~· Donna will get less value in terms of her equalization payment. That adjustment will reflect an
adjustment to the MVH unit values and the tax values; it will not reflect a re-allocation of the house value
or the re-assignment of any other awarded assets. Donna's suggestion that the District Court incorrectly
found that there is no possibility of the marital home being awarded to Donna is itself incorrect and is a
misapplic'ation of Bechtel.
11

11
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The District Court provided a key to understanding this whole issue when it said:
"The Trial Court's order for an equalization payment rested almost entirely upon the valuation of the Class A shares, and therefore ... the Court remands this issue to the Trial Court
to determine the amount of the equalization payment." (R. p. 329). Donna is not entitled to
any of Stan's other property awards on remand, i.e., his house, his vehicles, or his gold
shares, because the equalization payment was overwhelmingly based on the valuation of
the Class A shares. Stan does not get "more" value in the divorce than Donna if the Magistrate Court lowers the value of the Class A shares; he simply has less in payment obligations to Donna due to a correction in the overvaluation of the shares. Donna is not entitled
to enjoy the benefits of the overvaluation on remand. If the Magistrate Court had overvalued other assets, such as Stan's home, Donna would not be entitled to recapture the value
of that artificial inflation either. Donna is not suffering a loss or a disadvantage on remand.
She is simply getting the true value of the asset, not an artificially inflated value.
The fact that Stan might receive some additional value on remand, in the form of
reduced payments, is not relevant to the acceptance of benefits doctrine. As already stated,
that value, if awarded, comes in the form of a reduced equalization payment to Donna. (R.
pp. 320-37). And, while that adjustment involves a reduction of Donna's total award value,
it has nothing to do with the exhaustion of Stan's original benefits. It is merely a matter of
Donna getting too much value in the first place and having it adjusted back to normal on
remand. Again, the Bechtel doctrine only applies to a party who exhausts the value of his
or her benefits on appeal, to the detriment of the other party on remand. It does not apply
to correcting inflations. Donna did not file a cross-appeal on any of Stan's original judgment awards-his house, his dividends, his tax expenditure, etc. Donna is not entitled to
use the acceptance of benefits doctrine in the context of this appeal.
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Donna misunderstands other aspects of the ·doctrine. For instance, Donna cites to
Kramer v. Kastleman, 508 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2017) after saying that "proof of prejudice or

unconscionability is not required in applying the Doctrine in Idaho, nor does the moving
party have the burden of proving the same." (Appellant s Brief, p. 8). But if Kramer is
1

examined, as the District Court said it should be, then Donna must accept the case's holding
that "the acceptance-of-benefits doctrine is thus anchored in equity and bars an appeal if
the appellant voluntarily accepts the judgment's benefits and the opposing party is thereby
disadvantaged." Id., p. 217 (emphasis added). Donna fails to show that Stan has disadvantaged her on appeal. She did not challenge any of Stan's awards in the parties' first appeal.
Idaho case law is clear: "A party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument
is lacking." Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 128, 937 P.2d 434,440 (Ct. App. 1997).
Stan's view of the acceptance of benefits doctrine is consistent with other Idaho
case law. See Stockyards National Bank of Chicago v. Arthur, 45 Idaho 333, 262 P. 510
(1927) (the enforcement of the judgment by sheriffs sale is not inconsistent with, nor does
it affect, the relief asked on the appeal."); Long v. Hendricks, 117 Idaho 1051, 793 P .2d
1223 (1990) (in rejecting tender, a judgment creditor was not prohibited from an appeal);
Basic American, Inc. v. Shatila, 133 Idaho 726, 992 P.2d 175 (1999) (execution of a $3.26

million judgment did not preclude appeal where successful appeal would not result in a
reduced recovery on remand). In Basic American, the Court said:
"The reasoning behind the Bechtel rule, therefore, is grounded on preventing a
plaintiff from prosecuting an appeal which, if successful, might result in a reduced
recovery. The United States Supreme Court has reached the same conclusion: 'his
a generally accepted rule of law that where a judgment is appealed on the ground
that the damages awarded are inadequate, acceptance of payment of the amount of
the unsatisfactory judgment does not, standing alone~ amount to an accord and satisfaction of the entire claim."'

Respondent's Brief, Cross-Appellant's Brief I Page 16

ld. at p. 745 (emphasis added). 4 The Court should adopt this narrowing rule in
1

Bechtel and find that Stan is entitled to challenge va)uation issues on appeal.

Stan has already tried explaining to Donna the impropriety of using this doctrine
under the circumstances. (R. pp. 272-85). Donna has not yet taken the matter to heart, as
she continues to misstate and misuse the Bechtel rule. The Supreme Court should find that
Donna is appealing the matter frivolously and should award Stan his fees on appeal.
2. The District Court Properly Applied Bechtel to Stan's Awards.

The District Court correctly applied Bechtel to the use of Stan's property awards,
i.e., it refused to limit Stan's appeal options due to his use of the property awards.
Donna says that the District Court erred by not applying Bechtel to Stan's home
improvements. (Appellant s Brief p. 8). Donna says that the "marital home is very much
1

in the mix for possible redistribution on remand, especially if the value of the MVH units
are substantially lowered by the Court and there is a question as [to] how an equalization
would take place." (Id.). That is not true. The District Court remanded the equalization
payment to account for adjustments in the value of the MVH units: ''The Trial Court's
order for an equalization payment rested almost entirely upon the valuation of the Class A
shares, and therefore ... the Court remands this issue to the Trial Court to determine the
amount of the equalization payment." (R. p. 329). The District Court also remanded the
equalization payment to account for Stan's future earnings. (R. p. 330). However, the District Court did not remand the equalization payment to account for the use of the house.

4

Donna fails to meaningfully distinguish the Basic American holding. (Appellant's Brief, p. 7). Donna says
simply: "the Supreme Court said nothing about relaxing the doctrine, but reiterated what is one of the
accepted exceptions." (Id.). Donna's problem is that she refuses to see, and apply, the exception to the facts
of her own case, i.e., that Stan does not hazard getting less of an award on remand. Stan wi II get the same
award on remand, and the adjustment, if any, will be made to the equalization payment.
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(Id.). Donna's statement that the house is still "very much in the mix" on remand is incorrect and does not have any support in the record. Donna ignores the central point of the
remand, i.e., that the Magistrate overvalued the units to begin with. Donna only gets less
equalization payment on remand if "the value of the MVH units are substantially lowered
1
by the Court." She does not get any replacement value from Stan s other awards.

Donna overlooks the fact that Stan's improvements to the house likely increased
the value of the asset. Therefore, even if the house were "in the mix" for distribution on
remand, Donna cannot cite to Bechtel to challenge Stan's use of the house, as Stan did not
exhaust the value of the house. This same reasoning applies to Stan's receipt ofMVH unit
distributions and his use of the unit distributions to pay for community taxes. (Appellant's
Brief, pp. 9-12; R. pp. 314-18). Stan's actions did not exhaust any community assets to

which Donna was entitled on remand. Moreover, the MVH unit dividends are fungible
property, (Tr. Vol. I, p. 100, In. 18-25), and so Donna has not been harmed by their use.
Donna says that the acceptance of benefits doctrine applies to Stan's alleged distributions from Summit Orthopedic Equity ("SOE"). (Appellant's Brief, pp. 1-12). As with
her previous arguments, Donna overlooks the fact that Stan's receipt of the alleged distributions did not disadvantage her on remand. Donna did not cross-appeal the award of the
SOE interests to Stan, and so the company's distributions are not an issue to be decided on
remand. Moreover, the parties' receiver, Glen Townsend, showed that Stan did not misuse
the MVH unit dividends and distributions in any fashion. (R. pp. 293-96; Tr. Vol. I, pp.
95-98). Mr. Townsend confirmed that Stan carefully segregated and tracked these funds,
and that he (Mr. Townsend) was able to account for and control the funds, as per the Court's
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receivership orders. (R. pp. 294-95). 5 Mr. Townsend specifically rebutted Donna's statement that SEO distributed funds to Stan in 2018, noting that the company listed a distribution to Stan for tax purposes, but that Stan did not actually collect the cash distribution. (R.
pp. 295-96). Mr. Townsend confirmed that Stan was only a one-third owner in SOE and
did not have a controlling interest in the company. (Id.). Again, Donna fails to show why
this issue is relevant on remand or how the issue has caused her any disadvantage.
The District Court correctly found that the SOE earnings and profits remain the
separate property of the company. (R. p. 317). The Court noted that Donna failed to show
that there was any impropriety in the lack of company distributions to Stan. (Id.). This
Court should disregard the issue as another red herring by Donna on appeal.
To repeat-Donna is trying to use the acceptance of benefits doctrine for unintended purposes. Donna has been trying to stop Stan from using his property awards when
she did not appeal or challenge the awards. This Court should not be misled on the matter
and should affirm the District Court's decision to allow Stan's appeal under Bechtel.

3. The District Court Properly Remanded the Class A Unit Valuation.
Donna is asking this Court to uphold the Symbian sale price on remand. She is not
entitled to make that request on appeal. As Donna explains in her opening brief, the Supreme Court is limited on appeal to determining whether the District Court applied the
correct standard of review in the prior appeal. (Appellant's Brief, p. 13). Donna admits that
Hthe appellate court cannot reweigh the evidence, judge the credibility of the witnesses, or

5

Donna raises the moot and unfounded argument that Stan was in "blatant, contemptuous" disregard for the
Magistrate Court's temporary orders by selling some of his units to pay the parties' community taxes.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 30). Donna failed to appeal the issue to the District Court, and so she is not allowed
to address the issue on this appeal.
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substitute its view of the facts for that of the [lower appellate] com1." (Id.). Donna's extensive arguments in favor of the Symbian sale price, including her attempt to revisit the witnesses and evidence in support of the price, are not appropriate on this appeal.
Even if Supreme Court does review the Magistrate Court's valuation findings directly on appeal (see State v. Harris, 132 Idaho 843, 979 P.2d 1201 (1999) (when considering a second appeal, the Supreme Court is not merely reviewing the correctness of the
prior appellate decision)), the Comi should affirm the District Court and find that Magistrate Court erred in adopting the unadjusted Symbian unit value. The Court should uphold
the District Court's decision to remand the issue for further valuation proceedings.
The District Court had good reason to remand the Class A unit values. Mr. Pinkerton was Donna's only expert trial witness on the unit values, and he expressly adopted an
$8,272.00 unit value. (R. pp. 324-25). The District Court took Mr. Pinkerton at his word
and imposed an $8,272.00 Class A unit value. (Id.). The District Court found that the Magistrate Court erred because it rejected Mr. Pinkerton's value in favor of one of his data
points, i.e., the Symbian value, which Mr. Pinkerton used as a stepping-stone to reach his
ultimate conclusion value. In sum, the District Court correctly accepted Donna's expert
testimony on the issue of value and rejected the use of a substitute value. (R. p. 53).
, The Magistrate Court erred because it adopted a $9,191.00 unit value as an alleged
"mid-ran·ge" among Mr. Pinkerton's alternative report values. (R. p. 53). As the District
Court correctly observed, Mr. Pinkerton did not accept that value, i.e., the $9,191.00 Symbian vah.i'e, and he further adjusted the value down to $8,272.00 due to a lack of control in
the units. (R. pp. 324-25). The District Court noted that Mr. Pinkerton was "uncontested"
in the matter and that Donna's appellate brief acknowledged that "a trier of fact may not
arbitrarily disregard credible and unimpeached testimony of a witness." (R. p. 325). The
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District Court correctly rejected the Symbian value in favor of Mr. Pinkerton's final adjustment to the unit value. D01ma now confirms that "Keith Pinkerton ... was the only witness on the value of the MVH units." (Appellant's Brief, p. 15). Therefore, Donna has no
basis to dispute Mr. Pinkerton's value or seek the Symbian value on remand.
Stan acknowledges that Mr. Pinkerton discussed several potential valuation models
for the Class A units in his trial testimony. (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 118-41 ). But that fact is now
irrelevant, as Mr. Pinkerton ultimately adopted an $8,272.00 unit value, which was the
Symbian price-per-unit of $9,191.00 adjusted down for "lack of control" by the owners of
the units. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 141, In. 10-14). Donna tries to obscure this fact by discussing the
features of the Symbian sale and of Mr. Pinkerton's other models. (Appellant's Brief, p.

15; Tr. Vol. I, pp. 137-42). However, Donna is not allowed to modify the conclusions of her
own expert on appeal. Mr. Pinkerton said that the $8,272.00 value was a synthesis of his
other values and that it was not appropriate to use the straight Symbian value:
✓

"Well, I went with the $8272, which is the Symbian transaction adjusted for control-for lack of a control, only because I think it's a conservative number. Ifs my
job not to puff. I don't want a value that's too high." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 141, ln. 10-14);

✓

"I tried to go with something that felt more concrete, and what I believe is more
concrete. And I think the 8272 is a realistic number, and that's why I chose it." (Tr.
Vol. II, p. 141, In. 18-21 );

✓

"Given all of the information considered, it is my professional opinion that the minimum FMV per Class A units of Mountain View Hospital is $7,441 as of May 1,
2015. It is also my professional opinion that there is strong evidence to suggest that
the FMV could be substantially higher than this 'floor value' represents. Giving
due weight to all of the assumptions, strengths, weaknesses, and other uncertainties,
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I conclude that the FMV of each Class A unit is $8,272 as of as of May 1, 2015 on
a minority,

non □ marketable

basis." (See Appellant s Brief, p. 19, citing to Tr. Ex.
1

13 p 7-8; R. 962-963).
Donna fails to show that Mr. Pinkerton supported using the Symbian value as a
final unit value. (See Appellant's Brief). Donna is not entitled to override Mr. Pinkerton's
conclusion on value. See Reed v. Reed, 157 Idaho 705, 339 P.3d 1109 (2014). Far from
abusing its discretion, the District Court understood that it was "clearly erroneous" for the
Magistrate Court to reject Mr. Pinkerton's conclusion on value. Far from misunderstanding
the nature of Hsubstantial and competent evidence,'' as Donna suggests, (Id., p. 14), the
District Court understood that the value of $8,272.00 was the only admissible evidence on
the Class A unit values and that the Magistrate was not allowed to deconstruct Mr. Pinkerton's report looking for other values. The Supreme Court should affirm the District Court.
Donna gives a series of platitudinous statements in support of the $ 9, I 91. 00 unit
value, e.g., "The District Court's Memorandum Decision on Appeal contained little discussion of the facts and mostly stated personal opinions instead of appellate-oriented review of the evidence," (Appellant's Brief, p. 18); "The testimony of Pinkerton at trial also
provides insight as to the relationship between the $8,272 and the $9, 191," (Id., p. 19);
"The Trial Court not only considered, but adopted, the testimony, especially when the
Court indicated that 'the first and foremost is that [the Symbian sale] is an actual transaction
that the Court can rely upon," (Id., p. 20); "The Trial Court noted that all of the methods
used by Pinkerton were sound, which certainly conflicts with the District Judge's conclusion that the Pinkerton's testimony was rejected," (Id., p. 21); HThe $9,191 was not pulled
out [of] the air and is supported by substantial and competent evidence." (Id., p. 22). Stan
does not need to rebut these statements, except to note that they are devoid of any substance
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and are based in Donna's central error on appeal, i.e., that the Court should adopt a
$9,191.00 unit value when her own expert, Mr. Pinkerton, refused to do so. If Donna felt
that $9,191.00 was the appropriate Class A unit value, then she should have worked more
closely with Mr. Pinkerton on the matter before trial. The District Court conectly remanded
the matter, subject only to further tax adjustments on remand. (R. pp. 326-29).
Donna concludes her argument in favor of the $9,191.00 Symbian value by discussing several odds and ends from the trial, e.g., Mr. Pinkerton s discussion of anti-kick1

back laws and the passage of time and the alleged annual appreciation on the units. (Appellant's Brief, p. 21 ). Donna fails to mention that Mr. Pinkerton specifically discussed the

anti-kickback laws (Tr. Vol. II, p. 227-29) and the potential annual appreciation (Id., pp.
239-40) at the trial, and that he still arrived at $8,272.00 as a final Class A unit value. (Id.,
p. 236, ln. 15-16). Donna's attempt to bolster the $9,191.00 is, at best, disingenuous. The
District Court was right-neit her the Magistrate Court nor Donna has a valid reason to
jettison Mr. Pinkerton's conclusion on the Class A unit value. The District Court properly
remanded the issue, subject to specific tax considerations, to the Magistrate Court.
4. The District Court Properly Remanded the Issue of Tax Consequences.
The District Court properly remanded the issue of Stan's tax consequences in having to comply with the Magistrate Courfs payment orders. (R. pp. 327-29). As with her
other appellate issues, Donna seems to overlook the broader context of this issue.
Donna says that the Magistrate Court considered the tax consequences of Stan's
having to comply with the orders. (Appellant 's Brief, p. 23). But that is not the end of the
matter, as the Court then refused to include the consequences in its equalization order. (R.
p. 41). The District Court remanded the issue because the Magistrate Court should have
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incorporated Stan's tax consequences-no t merely discarded them. Donna cites to several
tax discussions in the record, but she still misses the more significant point, i.e., that Stan
received all non-cash, non-liquid items (R. p. 48), and that he cannot make his equalization
6
payment without first selling at least some of these items. Donna fails to mention that she

received almost all the parties' cash accounts-totaling several million dollars in liquid
accounts. (R. pp. 46-48). Given this reality, the Magistrate Court erred by ignoring Stan's
tax consequences. The District Court correctly remanded the issue for calculation.
In Carr v. Carr, 108 Idaho 684, 701 P.2d 304 (Ct. App. 1985), the Court illustrated
the importance of incorporating tax consequences in divorce property awards. In Carr, the
Magistrate ordered the parties to sell their family business to facilitate their divorce. On
appeal, the Court directed the Magistrate to consider the parties' tax consequences on remand: "The court should also consider the tax consequences (if any) to the Carrs, vis-a-vis
each other and vis-a-vis the buyer of the truck stop, resulting from differing treatment, for
tax purposes, of goodwill and of covenants not to compete." Id., p. 690. In our case, the
Magistrate Court should have considered the tax consequences of ordering Stan to make a
multi-million dollar equalization payment to Donna, especially when the Court knew (or
should have known) that Stan did not have the cash-on-hand to do so. The Court ordered
Stan to make the payment Hno later than one year from the date of the judgment." (R. p. 6).
Even if Stan could generate "extreme cash flow" via his MVH units, (R. p. 4), that cash
flow would not begin to cover Stan's equalization payment to Donna. Given Stan's limited

6

Stan received his MVH units valued at $4,498.177.00. Stan also received his home valued at $765,200.00,
his personal property valued at $41,675.00, and his vehicles valued at $76,750.00. Finally, Stan received
halfofthe parties 1 gold investments, valued at $30,358.00. (R. p. 48). These are all non-cash items. In other
1
word's, they are items that Stan must sell to realize their monetary value. Of Stan s $5,412,160.00 in community awards, he received 100% of his value in non-cash items. Donna fails to recognize that the sale of
any of these items could trigger a tax consequence for Stan.
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cash assets and his limited short-term income, Stan will have to sell many of his Mountain
View units. The District Court recognized this fact and properly remanded the issue. The
Court rightly explained: "While the trial Court is not required to consider tax liability as a
factor into its division of property, the tax consequences in this case distort the Trial Comi's
own determination of awarding an unequal division of property." (R. p. 328).
The District Court noted other deficiencies in the Magistrate's findings on the tax
issue, such as the lack of findings on Stan's evidence about his injury and his impending
retirement. (R. p. 328). The District Court said that the Magistrate Court was not free to
ignore this evidence in terms of satisfying the equalization payment. (R. p. 329).
For additional supporting case law, see Batra v. Batra, 17 P.3d 889, 895, 135 ldaho
388, 394 (Ct. App. 2001) (pivorce case remanded for calculation of tax consequences arising from the parties' exercise of stock options); Duhon v. Olbricht, No. 40572, 2014 Ida.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 42, at *7 (Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2014) (personal injury settlement division
in a divorce should address possible tax consequences). For persuasive case law, see In re

Wolters & Wolters, 168 N.H. 150, 156, 123 A.3d 1008, 1012 (2015) (when valuing marital
assets for the purpose of distribution, a trial court may consider potential tax consequences
to the-·parties only if a· taxable event, such as a sale or other transfer of property, is required
by the property distribution, or is certain to occur shortly thereafter); In re Telgener, 148
N.H. 190, 192, 803 A.2d 1051, I 053 (2002) (a court in a divorce action may consider
potential taxes in valuing marital assets if a taxable event such as a sale or other transfer of
property is required by the property distribution, or is certain to occur shortly thereafter);

Orgler v. Orgler, 237 N.J. Super. 342, 356, 568 A.2d 67, 73 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989)
(tax consequences resulting from a court-ordered sale of marital assets, or of a contemporaneous sale of assets by an ex-spouse necessary to meet his or her equitable distribution
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obligation, is not speculative at all. In such a circumstance, the ex-spouse is able to
demonstrate the present tax consequence); Dundas v. Dundas, 362 P.3d 468, 480 (Alaska
2015) (the magistrate court abused its discretion by disregarding the tax consequences on
marital property when the property would have to be s~ld following the divorce); 9
A.LR.5th 568, 2a (courts have generally found that consideration of tax consequences is
either required or at least appropriate where the tax consequences are immediate and
specific and/or the consequences arise directly from the court's decree).
For additional case law annotations, see "Divorce and separation: consideration of
tax consequences in distribution of marital property," 9 A.L.R.5th 568.
During the parties' trial, Stan provided the Magistrate Court with a detailed tax
report from his expert witness, Kevin Oakey, CPA. (Trial Exhibit N), wherein Mr. Oakey
explained the need to discount the Class A units to include the inevitable taxes which Stan
will have to pay upon the sale of the units. (R. p. 41; Trial Exhibit N). The Magistrate Court
largely ignored Mr. Oakey's testimony, explaining: ~'Oakey testified that in order to minimize taxes, he would advise the parties to hold their investments until death ... it would be
entirely speculative and a potential windfall to one party to adopt Oakey's immediate liquidation value of the community estate. Thus, the Court rejects the tax discounted value of
the assets." (R. p. 41). The District Court correctly noted the error of ignoring Mr. Oakey's
testimony and remanded the issue for further consideration. (R. p. 329).
The record supports the District Court s decision on taxes. Stan is facing imminent
1

retirement due to his health problems. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 595, ln. 21-23; 597, ln. 7-25; 598, In.
1-3; 599, ln. 20-25; 600, ln. 1-9). Stan will have to sell all his Mountain View units once
he retires·: (Tr. Vol. II, p. 164, ln. 1-7). Donna failed to rebut these two facts at trial, i.e.,
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she failed to rebut Stan's impending retirement and his mandatory unit sale. Both Mr. Pink~
erton (Tr. Vol. II, p. 219, In. 5~7) and Donna's other expert witness, Dianne Barker, CPA,
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 344, In. 3-20; 380, In. 21-25; 381, In. 1-4), failed to discuss Stan's impending
tax obligations in their reports. Just before trial, Donna hired Jason Coles as an expert to
rebut Mr. Oakey's report. (Appellant's Brief; p. 27). However, Mr. Coles failed to rebut
Mr. Oakey during the trial. Mr. Coles grudgingly admitted on cross-examination that Stan
cannot avoid his impending taxes on the sale of the units, and that the only way to decrease
Stan's overall taxes would be through an offset, e.g., if Stan were to make less income in
the future. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 650, ln. 3-25; p. 651, In. 1~ 7). At most, Mr. Coles gives vague
and conclusory testimony about "planning" tools to reduce Stan's taxes. He assumes (as
Donna assumes) that Stan can somehow keep the units as income-producing tools for a
long period of time. (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 651-5 2). Again, this testimony does not address the
fact that Stan is facing retirement and does not have the option to keep his units indefinitely.
D01.ma says that "Stan did not raise the issue of discounting the value for tax liability
because of the equalization payment order until the appeal herein." (Appellant':,, Brief; p.
24). That is misleading, as Stan did raise the tax issue at trial in the context of his health
problems and impending retirement. See above. Stan did not ask for a tax discount in the
context of the equalization payment at trial because he did not know he would have to make
the equalization payment at the time of trial. Stan did not have the means to challenge the
equalization payment until he filed for appeal. Donna is talking in circles on the issue.
Donna says that Stan can make his payments through other means, e.g., by getting
a loan, by the sale of non-essential properties. (Appellant's Brief, p. 25). Even if that is true,
Don~a fails to recognize that doing so will trigger other tax consequences, or else loan
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costs, for Stan. If anything, Donna's argument supports the need for remand on the issue
so that the equalization payment can include these inevitable taxes and costs for Stan.
Donna says that Stan "has no intention of committing waste by killing the golden
goose," i.e., that he has no intention of selling his MVH units. (Appellant's Brief, p. 25).
Donna fails to explain how Stan can avoid that outcome. Stan's MVH units constitute 83%
of his total property award, and his house constitutes another 14%ofhis award. See Footnote 6, above. Stan must either sell his house and some of the units, or else he must keep
the house and sell the bulk of the units, in order to make his payment to Donna. As with
Mr. Coles, Donna is still pretending that Stan can keep his units indefinitely. The District
Court correctly recognized that he could not. (R. pp. 328-39); (Tr. Vol. II, p. 595, In. 2123; 597, ln. 7-25; 598, In. 1-3; 599, ln. 20-25; 600, ln. 1-9); (Tr. Vol. II, p. 164, ln. 1-7).
Donna makes the confusing statement: "Much of this discussion is not to find error
in the District Court's personal opinions, but rather to point out that the District Court is
expressing personal opinion." (Appellant's Brie.f p. 26). But Donna fails to recognize that
the District Court is not expressing any tax opinions. The Court is merely remanding the
issue to the Magistrate Court for tax calculations. (R. pp. 328-29). As already shown, Stan
is entitled to the calculations on remand. This Court should affirm the District Court.
Donna tries to bait this Court into reconsidering Stan's health condition on appeal.

(App~llant 's Brief, pp. 28-29). For instance, Donna says that "having a 'concern' or 'worry'
is not the same as the necessity to retire." (Id., p. 29). Donna.then speculates: "Even if Stan
was unable to perform any surgeries, as long as he had a medical license and privileges at
MVH, he would still be able to maintain ownership of the MVH units." (Id.,-pp. 29-30).
Donna fails to substantiate these points from the record. At most, Donna shows that she

Respondent's Brief, Cross-Appellant's Brief I Page 28

objected to Stan's testimony at trial. (Id., p. 28-29). However, the Magistrate Court expressly overruled Donna's objection, and she failed to cross-appeal the error to the District
Court. (Id.). Donna has therefore waived the alleged objection and cannot complain that
the District Court has used Stan's health-related testimony as a basis to remand.
Donna says that "Stan invited the error by seeking all the property which he was
awarded." (Appellant's Brief, p. 31 ). That is not true. Stan does not fall under the invited
error doctrine because he did not ask the Magistrate Court to commit the error, i.e., he did
not ask the Magistrate Court to ignore his tax consequences. Just the opposite, Stan presented expert testimony on the need to include his tax consequences. See above. ''The invited error doctrine provides that where the error in question was encouraged or requested
by a party then that party is precluded from challenging on the basis of that error on appeal." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826,834,243 P.3d 642,650 (2010). Donna was the
only party to encourage the tax calculation error to the Magistrate Court. Stan's acceptance
of the MVH units did not result in, or encourage, the Magistrate's error. Stan was free to
present evidence on his tax consequences due to the inevitable sale of the units.
Donna's position on invited error, if adopted, would lead to absurd results in divorce cases. Stan agreed, by stipulation, to accept the MVH units, but that is because he
did not have a meaningful alternative, i.e., he was the only party capable of retaining the
units due to the hospital's restrictions. (See Statement of Facts, above). If the Magistrate
Court had acted on Donna's "Solomon type" suggestions, e.g., to sell all the units, then the
parties would still have incurred tax consequences and would have received only post-tax
sale values.for the-units. Stan's decision to accept the units and ask for a fair value of the
units was not itself an error from which he appealed. Rather, Stan appealed the Magistrate
Couds failure to appropriately discount the units to include the tax consequences of having
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to eventually sell the units. The District Court recognized this fact and appropriately remanded the issue for calculation of Stan's inevitable tax consequences.
Donna asks this Court to impose other types of remedies on appeal, such as imposing a constructive trust or a compulsory unit sale. (Appellant's Brief, p. 32). The Court
cannot do so without re-litigating the matter, which is contrary to Donna's cited case law.
See Reed v. Reed, above. The Court cannot add new agenda items to the District Court's
remand, as Donna did not seek to address these items during the parties' first appeal.
5. The District Court Did Not Err in Remanding the Equalization Payment.

Donna says that the District Court erred in remanding the equalization payment to
the Magistrate Court. (Appellant s Brief; p. 34). For the reasons set out above, Donna is
1

wrong. The Magistrate Court cannot possibly enforce its existing payment orders if it
changes the unit values or tax calculations on remand. Donna seems to think that she is
entitled to the same equalization payment no matter what happens on remand. That is not
true. Donna does not get a $2,107,440.00 equalization payment on remand if the Magistrate
Court adjusts its prior overvaluations on remand. The Supreme Court can disregard this
assignment of error and allow the Magistrate Court to consider the issue on remand. For
supporting ·1egal authorities, see cross-appeal arguments on the matter, below.
6.

the District Court Did Not Err in Remanding Spousal Maintenance.
The District Court did not err in remanding the spousal maintenance award. (R. pp.

333-35). As a threshold matter, Stan agrees that spousal maintenance is a moot point, at
least in terms of the duration of the award. Stan has already paid the full amount of the
award. (R. p. 59). Nevertheless, Stan may be entitled to a credit against his equalization
payment on remand if the Magistrate Court finds that Stan was paying Donna too much in
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spousal maintenance. Donna provides the legal basis for this outcome when she says that
there is a "significant tie?) between Idaho's spousal maintenance statute and its property
division statute. (Appellant's Brief, p. 38). Donna argues that it was possible that the Magistrate Court "considered the [equalization payment] to be in the form of spousal maintenance.'' (Id.). Stan is entitled to use that same legal reasoning in favor of a maintenance
credit on remand, i.e., that he should get credit for any wrongful payments to Donna under
Idaho Code § 32-705 due to its proximity in terms with Idaho Code § 32-712.
Donna suggests that Stan had other ways to get relief from his payments because
"spousal maintenance is modifiable." (Appellant's Brief,' p. 42). That is not true. Stan appealed because he felt the maintenance award was incorrect. Stan was not entitled to use
the modification process as a substitute for his appeal. Donna's position on mootness, if
accepted, would put spousal maintenance awards beyond all meaningful relief on appeal,
with parties' like Stan getting less relief in proportion to the length of their appeal. Donna
significantly delayed the parties' first appe~l with her protracted motions and discovery
requests. (R. pp. 79-93; 183-268). Donna should not be able to use the mootness doctrine
as a shield due to the mere passage oftime. This Court should affirm and remand the issue.
The Court should instruct the Magistrate to give credit to Stan for any overpayments.
Donna suggests that the facts in Stewart v. Stewart, 143 Idaho 673, 152 P.3d 544
(2007) are similar to the facts in this case. (Appellant's Brief, p. 39). That is not true, as
Stan's situation is very different from that in Stewart. In that case, Stewart was in the prime
of his :career, "and it was reasonable to assume that his earning capacity would remain at a
similar or higher level for much of his career." Stewart, p. 680. Stan, by contrast, is in the
twilight of his career, and the unrebutted evidence at trial shows that he has health problems
that will force to him to retire. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 595, In. 21-23; 597, In. 7-25; 598, ln. 1-3;
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599, ln. 20-25; 600, In. lw9). In Stewart, the wife received primarily non-liquid assets, and
the comt found she would have to sell her home to meet her needs. By contrast, Donna has
received significant liquid assets and does not need to sell her home. In Stewart, the wife
faced progressive disability. By contrast, Donna is not disabled and is capable of working.
Moreover, Donna failed to show that she would fully exhaust her assets under her property
awards. Just the opposite-Do nna testified that she would not need any spousal maintenance as long as the property was "fairly divided." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 273, In. 5-9). The District
Court recognized these facts and properly remanded the issue. (R. pp. 333-35).
Donna's situation is similar to that of the wife in Lyon v. Lyon, 439 N.W.2d 18
(Minn. 1989). In Lyon, the parties divorced after a long-term .marriage. The husband had
a significant income, and the couple had substantial property. The Court awarded the wife
liquid assets and a total property distribution of about $3.6 million. The wife was unable to
7
support herself through employment. In addition, the husband acknowledge d that he could
8
pay the $4,000.00 per month in spousal maintenance ordered by the trial court. And yet,

despite the wife's inability to support herself, and despite the husband's payment abilities,
the Minnesota Supreme Court found that the wife was not entitled to any support: "Even
allowing for income taxes, the wife's net income [from the property award] would comfortably exceed her living expenses of $78,000 a year." Id., p. 22. The Court further explained:

~~A

spouse's ability to pay maintenance does not ... obviate the statutory mandate

that the other spouse's own independent financial resources must be considered too." Id.
7

8

By contrast, Donna admitted at trial that she can support herself through employment, at least
partially. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 273, ln. 10-17); See also R. p. 333-35.
Minnesota~s spousal maintenance statute is similar to Idaho's statute, except the initial test in the
statue is stated in the disjunctive "or" rather than "and," and is therefore arguably more pennissive than Idaho's statute. See Minn.Stat. Sec. 5 I 8.552.
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In our case, as in Lyon, Donna is not entitled to spousal maintenance. Donna testified at trial that she did not need any spousal ·maintenance as long as the property was
'~fairly divided." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 273, In. 5-9). She testified that he could work full time at
minimum wages, or higher. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 273, ln. 10-17). She testified that she has approximately $4,000.00 per month in living expenses, which is only about $2)43.33 more
than a minimum wage income. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 260, In. 19-21 ). The District Court correctly
1
found that the Magistrate Court erred in not considering Donna s potential income. (R. pp.

333-35). Even Ms. Barker, one of Donna's expert support witnesses, admitted at trial that
she did not consider Donna's ability to work or earn money in her analysis (Tr. Vol. II, p.
346, ln. 22-5). The District Court properly remanded the issue for consideration.
· To qualify for spousal maintenance, Donna had the burden to show at trial that she
lacked sufficient property to meet her reasonable needs and that she was unable to support
herself through employment. Idaho Code §32-705; Moffett v. Moffett, 151 Idaho 90, 94,
253" P.3d 764, 767 (Ct. App. 2011). Donna failed to make either showing at trial.
If anything, Donna's evidence confirmed that she was capable of self-support.

Donna testified that she was capable of working. (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 269-73 ). Donna failed to
mention any limiting employment factors, e.g., disability or health problems. (Id.). She
testified that she is a very good cook, (Tr. Vol. II, p. 261, In. 11 ), and that she was qualified
to work at a quilt shop. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 270, ln. 7-8). She assumed that she would only make
minimum wage in such a job, (Tr. Vol. II, p. 273), but she presented no further evidence,
besides her best guess, as to her expected wage levels. She candidly admitted that she has
never tried to get employment during marriage. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 269, ln. 6-11). The District
Court properly remanded the award for consideration of Donna's true employability.
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For additional cases in support of the District Court's decision to remand, see Theiss
1
v. Theiss, 112 Idaho 681, 682, 735 P.2d 992, 993 (1987) (if the magistrate s findings are

not suppo1ied by the facts, or if incorrect legal principles have been applied, then the Supreme Court is not bound to affirm the decision); Stewart v. Stewart, 143 Idaho 673, 679,
152 P.3d 544, 550 (2007) (the trial court must give due consideration to each party's financial needs and abilities); Shepard v. Shepard, 94 Idaho 734, 737, 497 P.2d 321, 324 (l 972)
(the trial court must give due consideration to the financial abilities of both parties). The
Supreme Court should affirm the District Court's remand order as per these authorities.
7. The District Court Properly Awarded Costs to Stan.
The District Court properly awarded costs to Stan. Stan had prevailed on his first
appeal and was entitled to Rule 40 costs. (R. pp. 345-46). Donna fails to show otherwise.
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 1-43). This Court should uphold the District Court's costs award to

the extent that it upholds the District Court's remand on the other issues on appeal.
8. Donna is Not Entitled to Costs and Fees on Appeal.
Donna is not entitled to her costs and fees on appeal. As set out above, Donna did
not have-a good basis for filing her appeal. Donna has misused the acceptance of benefits
doctrine and the invited error doctrine. She has attempted to relitigate, or re-argue, several
of the parties' factual disputes on appeal. Donna failed to discuss, in more than cursory
terms, the relevant standards for costs and fees on appeal. In sum, Donna's appeal was
unfounded. This Court should decline to award Donna her costs and fees on appeal.
Donna says, in conclusory fashion, that HStan has only asked for the District Court
to second guess and substitute _its opinion for that of the trial court." (Appellan t's Brief, p.
44). Thafis not true. As set out above, Stan had a substantial basis-in fact, in law, in the

Respondent's Brief, Cross-Appellant's Brief I Page 34

record-to file his first appeal. Stan had a solid basis to opposed Donna's appeal. This
Court should affirm the District Court's remand orders and deny Donna's appeal.

ATTORN EY FEES AND COSTS
Stan is entitled to his costs and fees on appeal for having to defend against Donna's
frivolous an unfounded argument on appeal. See I.A.R. 3 5(b)( 5) and I. A. R. 40, 41. See
also Idaho Code § 12-121. Donna has misused the acceptance of benefits doctrine and the
invited error doctrine. She has attempted to relitigate, or re-argue, several of the parties'
factual disputes. In sum, Donna's appeal was frivolous and unfounded.
Idaho follows what is known as the "American Rule" for attorney fees which holds
that "no fee awards are available absent contractual or statutory authority." Sopatyk v.
Lemhi C aunty, 151 Idaho 809, 819, 264 P. 3d 916, 926 (2011). Stan is entitled, by statute,
to fees under Idaho Code § 12-121. This statute applies to cases on appeal. See Minich v.
Gem State Developers, 99 Idaho 911, 591 P.2d 1078, 1979 (1979). Donna's unfounded
request to adopt the Symbian unit value, despite Mr. Pinkerton's evidence, together with
her unreasonable opposition to the other remand issues, is frivolous, unreasonable, and
without foundation. See Berkshire lnvs., LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 87,278 P.3d 943,
957 (2012). The Court should award Stan his fees in having to defend the matter.
Should Stan prevail on appeal, he seeks an award of costs under I.A.R. 40.

CONCLUSION
The Court should deny Donna's appeal in its entirety. Donna is not entitled to the
relief she seeks on appeal, or else she has waived her right to relief for the issues on appeal.
The Court should award Stan his costs and attorney fees, in amounts to be proven by mem1
orandum. The Court should affirm the District Court s remand on the above issues.

Responden t's Brief, Cross-App ellant's Brief I Page 35

(end of response brief)
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CROSS-APP EAL

Stan submits the following issues and arguments on cross-appeal. See I.AR. 35(c);
See Notice of Cross Appeal, R. pp. 349-52.
STATEMEN T OF THE CASE

See the statement of facts and procedures, above.
ISSUES ON CROSS-APP EAL

1. Did the Lower Courts Err in Admitting the Testimony of Diane Barker?
2. Did the Lower Courts Err in Making an Unequal Property Division?
STANDARD S OF APPELLAT E REVIEW

See general appellate review standards, above.
CROSS-APP EAL ARGUMENT
1. The Magistrate Court Erred in Admitting the Testimony of Diane Barker.

The Magistrate Court erred in admitting the testimony of Diane Barker at trial. The
District Court has perpetuated that error by affirming the Magistrate's decision on appeal.
(R. p. 331-33). To put the matter in context, Donna called Ms. Barker as an expert witness,
but she did not give any valuation testimony. (Tr. Vol. II, 303, In. 3-16). Ms. Barker limited
herself to giving alleged projections on the growth and appreciation of the parties' assets.
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 304, ln. 3-19). Ms. Barker admitted upfront that she stayed with a two percent (2%) investment rate, or the treasury rate, for all future growth on Donna s assets. (Tr.
1

Vol. II, pp. 304-05). Ms. Barker said she was trying to show "how the parties will be situated in 5,

rn, 15, or 20 years.

11

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 312, ln. 12-25; p. 313, ln. 1-6).
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Stan objected to the admission of Ms. Barker's testimony due to irrelevancy, saying
that she was attempting to value the parties' marital assets based on speculative future values of the assets. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 316, ln. 15-24; p. 317, In. 1-14). The Magistrate Court
overruled the objection, but then the Court assured Stan that the objection was unnecessary
because the Court was not going to consider future values of the assets in its findings. (Tr.
Vol. II, p. 317, ln. 15-18). However, the Magistrate Court later changed its mind and considered the content of Ms. Barker's testimony in its findings. For instance, the Court concluded that Stan would enjoy "extreme cash flow" from his assets and that Donna would
9
only be getting a modest 2% return on her assets. (R. p. 41 ). Stan objected to the use of

Ms. Barker's report, (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 321-25), and the Magistrate Court ultimately excluded
the report. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 334). Stan appealed the use of the testimony. (R. p. 63).
The District Court affirmed the Magistrate Court's use of Ms. Barker's testimony,
saying that her methodology was like a scientist using a calculator and that she was other10
wise qualified to testify as an expert. (R. p. 332). The District Court found that any errors

in admitting her testimony were harmless and that the impact of her testimony was negligible. (R. pp. 332-33). The Court said that Stan offered no rebuttal evidence. (Id.).
The Supreme Court can exercise free review over this issue on appeal: "Relevance
is a question of law over which the Court exercises free review." State v. Seitter, 127 Idaho
356, 358, 900 P.2d 1367, 1369 (1995). The Court should find that Ms. Barker's testimony
about the. parties' future earnings, including her testimony about Donna's 2% investment

The Magistrate Court further explained: "Barker noted that the treasury bill interest on any assets
would be approximately equal to inflation. This would mean that Donna would have to live off
her assets and exhaust them in the process." (R. p. 55).
10
See Tr. Vol. I, p. 131, In. 5-21, where Stan points out the error of the Court's "calculator>\ analogy, as Ms.
Barker's testimony involved qualitative judgments, not quantitative math problems.

9
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growth rate, was irrelevant to the division of the parties' marital property. By default, Idaho
statutory law requires a "substantially equal division" based on the current value of the
marital property. Idaho Code § 32-712(a). Once established, the value is not further adjusted for future growth: "Any fluctuation in value of marital assets is not a reason to modify the division." Swordv. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242,253, 92 P.3d492, 503 (2004). Admittedly,
Idaho Code§ 32-712(b)(6) allows the Magistrate Court to make an unequal property division based on the upresent and potential earning capability of each party. But in our case,
11

the Magistrate Court did not make any detailed findings of the parties' respective future
employment earnings, i.e., both Stan's and Donna's future earnings. The Magistrate Court
said that Stan would probably enjoy high future earnings because of his MVH units, (R. p.
41), and it said nothing about Donna's future earnings. At trial, Ms. Barker candidly admitted that she did not perform any analysis on Donna's future earnings. (Tr. Vol. II, p.
346, ln. 22-25). Therefore, Magistrate Court erred in performing its unequal property division analysis. This Court should exercise free review over the matter and find that the District Court erred in affirming the Magistrate's use of Ms. Barker's testimony. In the alternative, the Court should find that the Magistrate and District Courts abused their discretion
in the matter, See State v. Le Veque, 426 P. 3d 461, 464 (2018), as they did not act consistently with the relevant legal standards for imposing an unequal division of property.
As to future growth of assets, see In re Marriage of Duncan, 90 Cal. App. 4th 617,
635,108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 833, 846 (2001) (once having made an equal division of community
property, the court is not required to speculate about what either or both of the spouses may
do with his or her equal share and is not required to engraft on the division further adjustments to reflect situations based on theory rather than fact). The Magistrate and District
Courts erred to the extent they used Ms. Barker's testimony about the slow growth and
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small return rates on Donna's assets. At a minimum, the Courts should have found that Ms.
Barker's testimony was speculative on the matters growth and future earnings, as she did
not provide any analysis of Donna's future investment options:
The word "speculation" in relationship to testimony has been defined as Hthe art of
theorizing about a matter as to which evidence is not sufficient for certain
knowledge." An expert opinion that is speculative or unsubstantiated by facts in the
record is inadmissible because it would not assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or determine a fact that is at issue. Expert opinion that merely suggests
possibilities would only invite conjecture and may be properly excluded.
Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 565, 97 P.3d 428, 432 (2004) (internal citations

omitted) .. This Court should find that Ms. Barker's testimony as speculative.

A. Ms. Barker's Testimony Was Not Expert Witness Testimony.
The Magistrate and District Courts erred in admitting Ms. Barker's testimony as
alleged expert witness testimony. The standards to determine the admissibility of an ex~
pert's opinions are found in I.R.E. 702 and 703. See Nield v. Pocatello Health Servs., Inc.,
156 Idaho 802,850,332 P.3d 714,462 (2014). Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
According to this rule, the expert witness' function is to provide testimony on subjects that are beyond the common sense, experience, and education of the trier of fact. State
v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 694, 760 P.2d 27, 33 (1988); State v. Roles, 122 Idaho 138, 146,

832 P .2d 311, 319 (Ct. App. 1992). In reviewing the admission of expert testimony, this
Court must focus its inquiry on the principles and the methodology which the expert uses
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to give his or her testimony. State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 646, 962 P.2d 1026, 1030
(1998). Th~ Court should find that expert opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the record is of no assistance in rendering a verdict, and is thus
inadmissible. Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 811, 979 P.2d 1165, 1169 (1999).
By her own admissions, Ms. Barker did not provide the Magistrate Court with a
sound methodology or any reasoned analysis from the methodology. She admits that she
was a mere software technician, plugging in numbers and parroting the results. This fact is
evident from the _following exchanges between Ms. Barker and Stan's counsel at trial:

Q. You don't rely - I mean, you're just relying on the software totally?
A. Yeah. I was - in that regard, I was being just - just a technician, just putting
the,numbers injust like everybody does Q. Okay. IflA. - into all kinds of software.
(Tr. Vol., II, p. 366, ln. 4-10)
Q. Do you know how they were calculated?

A. The calculations?
Q. Yeah.

A. Yeah. Well, the software does it.
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 359, ln. 22-25).

Q. So anybody 1
A. So there s nothing mysterious.

Q. So anybody can use that program?
A.· Yeah, if they knew how to input the data.

Q. So it's just a matter of getting the data from a party?
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A. Uh-huh.
Q. Plugging it in, and pushing a button?
A. Yes, similar to the millions and millions of people that use Turbo Tax every
year.
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 391, In. 11-20).
In explaining her alleged methodology, Ms. Barker admitted that she was entering
the data which was provided by others into her software and that the software created all
the opinions and the future earning models. (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 308-311.) According to Ms.
Barker, the function that she had performed was "similar to the millions and millions of
people that use Turbo Tax every year," (Tr. Vol. II, p. 391, ln. 2-20), and so her opinions
in the matter cannot be said to be "beyond the common sense, education and experience of
the trier of fact." See State v. Hester, p. 694. The Magistrate Court erred in admitting Ms.
Barker's perfunctory use of her software to provide testimony on future earnings.

B. Ms. Barker's Testimony Was Unreliable.
Ms. Barker's testimony about future earnings was based on the outputs provided to
her by her software program. The models she presented were all created by the software,
(Tr. Vol. II, pp. 308-310), and she was using the software to analyze how the parties would
be ~'situated in five, ten, fifteen, twenty years using a certain set of assumptions." (Tr. Vol.
II, p. 312, ln. 20-22). Ms. Barker did not do any independent investigation or analysis of
her own; she simply took the information provided to her and entered it into the software.
Ms. Barker failed to show that she used her training, skills, or knowledge as an accountant
to independently confirm the software calculations or models. She failed to provide the
Court with any documentation or evidence that the software calculations were reliable and

Respondent's Brief, Cross-Appellant's Brief I Page 42

accurate. Ms. Barker testified that she had didn't know if her software was mathematically
correct, and she failed to substantiate its accuracy by reference to studies:

Q. And what 1s the name of the software program?
A. Family Law Software.

Q. Do you know of any studies or statistics or case law which verifies that the calculations prepared by Family Law Software are scientifically or -- or are just valid
or accurate?
A. Mathematically correct? I don't know of any studies. You can --any person can
look at the --all of the data behind it, so you can calculate it.

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 391, ln. 2- 10).
In sum, Ms. Barker put blind reliance in her software. As a certified public accountant, Ms. Barker should have been qualified to investigate, to analyze, and to verify the
results of her software, but she failed to do so at trial. Persuasive case law is clear: "An
expert opinion must 'set forth facts' and, in doing so, outline a line of reasoning arising
from a logical foundation. Thus, 'an expert who supplies nothing but a bottom line supplies
nothing of value to the judicial process."' Brainard v. Am. Skandia Life Assurance Corp.,
432 F.3d 655, 664 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, "in an adjudicatory system that requires expert testimony when the topic at issue is 'based on scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge,' the blind acceptance by a court of the efficacy
of a particular piece of software is inconsistent with the traditional manner in which a court
resolves factual disputes." West Coast Prods. v. Doe, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110847, *15.
The Magistrate and District Courts erred by admitting her testimony into evidence.
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C Ms. Barker's Testimony Was Speculative and Unsubstantiated.
Ms. Barker relied on several generic assumptions to form her opinions, including
assumptions about public benefits discount rates, future investment rates, the parties' future
earning rates, the annual increases in Stan's income, and the future sale price of the MVH
units. To illustrate, Ms. Barker failed to explain the source of the Hdiscounts" in her proposed Social Security rates, other than by saying: HWell, actually the software does that."
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 340, ln. 10-25). In addition, Ms. Barker failed to include any tax consequence analysis, (Tr. Vol. II, p. 344, In. 3-16), and she failed to consider any future earnings
or wages for D01ma. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 346, ln. 23-25). Ms. Barker used only generic worklife expectancy figures for Stan and assumed that he is still in good health. (Tr. Vol. II, p.
376, In. 9-14). She even admitted that her analysis is probably now "invalid" because it
assumed that Donna was able to own some of the MHV units (Tr. Vol. II, p. 386, In. 8-14).
The District Court erred in ignoring these gaps in Ms. Barker's testimony. (R. p. 332).
Ms~ Barker admitted that she picked Donna's future 2% earnings rate as the default
treasury return rate, and that she did not consider any future rate fluctuations:
Q. Do you know how ... you assumed a 2 percent interest rate? Do you know how
long that the investment rate will be 2 percent?

A. I don't, but I read economists' projections and its-everybod y's pretty ...
Q. Do youA. ... clear that it's going to be low for a long time. We don't know how long.

Q. _So you're assuming it's going to stay at 2 percent for 20 years?

A. Yeah, bec,ause we have to have some constants.
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(Tr. Vol. II, p. 369, ln. 7-18). Beyond this, Ms. Barker failed to perform any expert
analysis on Donna's future investment options. She failed to justify her decision to base
her models on a static 2% growth rate. In the end, Ms. Barker acknowledged that her testimony on future earnings was based on unverified assumptions and speculations:
Q. So there's a lot of assumptions and, actually, a lot of speculation that goes into
that, isn't there?
A. Oh, yes, it has to by its nature.

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 369, ln. 22-25).
Of _course, Stan recognizes the necessity for experts to make at least some reasonable assumptions to describe their statistical phenomena. But Ms. Barker's assumptions
regarding long-term income and investment rates are never fully explained or justified. For
instance, Ms. Barker assumed that Stan can be employed long-term and that he does not
have any health problems (Tr. Vol. II, p. 358, ln. 9-17; 376, In. 9-13). She assumed that
Donna can only invest her funds at "a safe rate of return of 2 percent" and that Donna
cannot invest at a higher rate to generate extra income to support her expenses. (Tr. Vol.
II, p. 345, In. 22-24). She assumed that Donna will not have future employment income.
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 346, ln. 22-25; p. 358, ln. 18-20). She assumed that Stan will get the benefit
of his MVH unit returns "for a lot of years," even if Stan is no longer employed as a
11
physiciaff at Mountain View Hospital. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 383, ln. 14-17). She also assumed

that Stan will not have to sell his units once he retires. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 384, ln. 1-5). These
are all false assumptions, as shown elsewhere in the record. See above. The District and
11

Importantly, Ms. Barker admitted at trial that she was unaware of the fact that Stan would have to sell his
MVH units upon retirement and that he would no longer get annual returns on the units after his retirement.
(See Tr. Vol. II, p. 383, In. 14-25: "Q. You understand that he must continue to work to get that? A. I do
not understand that. Q. Okay. You're not aware that he's got to continue to work as a physician at the
hospital to get that? A. I-I've read some documents and have never been able to see where it said that.").
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Magistrate Courts erred in allowing this heavily flawed, heavily biased testimony to stay
in the record. The Courts should have stricken the testimony from the record.
In sum, the Magistrate and District Courts erred in admitting Ms. Barker's testimony into evidence at trial. Ms. Barker did not provide any substantial or competent evidence at trial. The Supreme Court should review the matter de novo and find that Ms.
Barker's testimony was unsubstantiated and, therefore, irrelevant to the issues at trial. In
the alternative, the Court should find that the Magistrate and District Courts abused their
discretion in admitting the testimony into evidence at trial. The Court should instruct the
Magistrate Court to disregard Ms. Barker's testimony in its entirety on remand.
2. The Magistrate Court Erred in Making an Unequal Property Division.

The Magistrate Court erred in making an unequal property division, i.e., a 60%
division in Domms favor. The Court based the award on flawed evidence about the value
of the MVH units and about Stan's future earnings. (R. pp. 50-51). In other words, the
award was not based on a "compelling reason" under Idaho Code§ 32-712. "Proper appellate review requires a statement of the 'compelling' reasons for the unequal division. This
statement is indispensable not only to inform the parties and an appellate court of the basis
for the decision, but also to assure compliance with the statutory standards governing that
decision." Hentges v. Hentges, 115 Idaho 192, 194, 765 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Ct App. 1988).
Donna testified at trial that she was not asking for an unequal division of the marital
prope1iy. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 271, ln. 22-24). She said she only wanted the property that she had
designated on her exhibits. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 272, ln. 3-9). Donna's counsel later tried to
modify Donna's testimony, to include a request for an unequal division of property, but he
failed to call Donna back to the witness stand to attest to his attempted modifications. (Tr.
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Vol. II, pp. 317-318). The Magistrate Court should have accepted Donna's uncontradicted
testimony that the parties wanted only a substantially equal division of property. The Court
erred in overriding Donna's testimony and in making a division to the contrary.
In making its unequal property awards, the Magistrate Court was supposed to enter
specific findings on the factors listed in Idaho Code§ 32-712, e.g., the health of the parties,
their employability, their financial needs, etc. The Magistrate Court engaged in only a cursory review of these factors in its memorandum decision. (R. pp. 50-51 ). The Court then
ignored any evidence which mitigated against an unequal property division. For instance,
the Court ignored the fact that Donna said she could probably obtain at least a minimum
wage job, or higher (Tr. Vol. II, p. 273, ln. 14-17), and that her living expenses were only
about $4,000.00 per month. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 260, ln. 19-21 ). The Magistrate Court then failed
to recognize that Donna was capable of earning almost half her annual living expenses
through employment, (Id.), 12 and that she was scheduled to receive over 2 million dollars
in cash assets. (R. pp. 46-48). In sum, the Magistrate Court failed to find any "compelling"
reasons to deviate from Idaho's standard of making a substantially equal division of marital
assets. (R. -pp. 330-31). The District Court should have found that the Magistrate abused
its discretion and did not rely on any substantial and competent evidence. This Court should
remand the issue with instructions to enter a substantially equal property division.

12

With a minimum wage job, Donna could earn at least $15,080.00 per year, or$ 1)256.67 per month. That
is more than 30% of her admitted monthly expenses. See prior arguments, above. In 1terms of spousal
11
maintenance, the District Court found that there was no reason not to consider Donna s own admission
that she, atthe very least could work a minimum wage job." (R. p. 334). The District Court should have
applied that same reasoning to the paities' prope1ty division under LC.§ 32-712 and remanded the issue
for additional consideration.
1

Responden t's Brief, Cross-Appellant's Brief I Page 47

3., The Magistrate Court Abused Its Discretion.
Even without free review on appeal, the Supreme Court should find that the Magistrate and District Courts have abused their discretion in these two matters. The Courts
failed to act within the textual boundaries of I.R.E. 702 and Idaho Code § 32-712, thus
violating the third prong of the abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Le Veque, above.
The Courts also failed to base their findings on an exercise of reason, thus violating the
fourth prong of the standard. Id. For the reasons set out above, the Supreme Court should
remand these two errors back to the Magistrate Court, with appropriate instructions to disregard Ms. Barker's testimony and to enter a substantially equal division of property.
4. The Magistrate Court Has Prejudiced Stan's Rights.
The Magistrate Court has substantially prejudiced Stan's rights to a fair trial and a
substantially equal division of the community property. See I.R.C.P. 61. See also l.R.E.
702, Idaho Code§ 32-712. The Magistrate's errors, as set out above, are inconsistent with
the notions of substantial justice. See Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 127 Idaho 565,
903 P.2d 730 (I 995). The District Court perpetuated these errors by not remanding the
matters back to the Magistrate Court for further determination.
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

Stan is entitled to attorney fees and costs on cross-appeal in the event of any frivolous or unfounded defenses on the appeal. See I.A.R. 35(a)(5) and I.AR. 40, 41.
Idaho follows what is known as the "American Rule" for attorney fees which holds
that "no fee awards are available absent contractual or statutory authority." Sopatyk v.
Lemhi County, 151 Idaho 809,819,264 P.3d 916,926 (2011). lfDonna attempts to further
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perpetuate the lower courts' errors on appeal, as set out above, this Court should award
Stan his fees under Idaho Code § 12-121. This statute applies to cases on appeal. See Min-

ich v. Gem State Developers, 99 Idaho 911, 591 P.2d 1078, 1979 (1979). See also Sinclair

& Co. v. Gurule, 114 Idaho 362, 367, 757 P.2d 225, 230 (Ct. App. 1988) (attorney fees
will be awarded to the prevailing party on appeal when the Supreme Court is left with the
abiding belief that the appeal was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably
or without foundation). In our case, Dom1a can only defend against Stan's cross-appeal by
resorting to more speculations about the record and by ignoring the evidentiary gaps in the
record. In doing so, Donna is violating Idaho Code § 12-121. Donna cannot reasonably
argue in favor of Ms. Barker's testimony and the unequal division of marital property, and
this Court should award Stan his fees if Donna continues to do so on cross-appeal.
Should Stan prevail on cross-appeal, he seeks an award of costs under I.A.R. 40.

CONCLUSION
This Court should remand the issues of the admission of Ms. Barker's testimony
and the unequal division of community property, as set out above. The Court should award
Stan his reasonable attorney fees and costs, as set out above.
..

Dated: January 22, 2020
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I certify that on January 28, 2020, I caused a true and correct copy of this entire
document to be served, as follows:
David A. Johnson
dave@attomeyidaho.com
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